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Holland’s Own Kennedy Affair. Conspiracy Theories  
on the Murder of Pim Fortuyn 
Jelle van Buuren ∗ 
Abstract: »Hollands Kennedy-Affäre. Verschwörungstheorien über den Mord 
an Pim Fortuyn«. In this article we will analyze the functioning of conspiracy 
dispositives from the bottom up and the nexus between conspiracy dispositives 
and security dispositives in the context of the political rise of right-wing popu-
list Pim Fortuyn and the various conspiracy theories that arose after his murder 
and the effects these conspiracy theories had on Dutch politics and society. 
These counter-conspiracy theories revolved mainly around the suggestion that 
the political establishment was responsible for the murder or at least had 
turned a blind eye to it. The analysis shows that although a small part of the 
conspiracy constructions can rightfully be understood as counter-conspiracy 
dispositives raised bottom up, in the majority of the cases a blurring can be 
noted between counter-conspiracy dispositives and conspiracy dispositives. This 
can be explained by the fact that - parts of - the seemingly counter-conspiracy 
dispositives were initiated, adopted and instrumentalized by actors from 
‘above’: actors from the Dutch political and cultural establishment. In fact, an 
intra-elite competition was being battled out. 
Keywords: conspiracy, security governance, animal rights activists, intelligence, 
Pim Fortuyn. 
1.  Introduction 
The rather dull yet friendly image of Dutch politics with its tradition of toler-
ance, the willingness to reach compromises on potentially divisive societal 
issues and a lack of serious political violence was turned upside down within 
no time at the beginning of the 21st century. The stormy entrance of the right-
wing populist Pim Fortuyn on the political scene heralded an unprecedented 
episode of political polarization, culminating in the murder of Pim Fortuyn by a 
lone activist originating from animal rights activist circles. The murder of For-
tuyn gave rise to various conspiracy theories which revolved mainly around the 
suggestion that the political establishment was responsible for the murder or at 
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least had turned a blind eye to it. In this article we will define a conspiracy 
theory as “a narrative that is constructed in order to explain an event or se-
quence of events as the result of a group of people secretly cooperating with 
evil intentions” (Birchall 2006, 34). Conspiracy theories should therefore be 
treated as ‘coded social critiques’ in which not only facts and truth are contest-
ed but especially the ethos and legitimacy of society’s main institutions (Miller 
2002). The conspiracy theories on the Fortuyn murder will initially be concep-
tualized as ‘counter-conspiracy dispositives’ (De Graaf and Zwierlein 2013, in 
this HSR Special Issue) mechanism through which the state’s rule and ruling 
practices are delegitimized and (violent) resistance against the powers that be is 
legitimized. Further, it is assumed that a nexus exists between conspiracy dis-
positives and security dispositives, meaning that invoking the ‘conspiracy’ 
accusation on the part of the state functions as a legitimizing argument to intro-
duce new modes of security governance or – on the other hand – as an legiti-
mizing argument for counter-securitization moves and resistance to securitizing 
agencies when invoked by oppositional actors (De Graaf and Zwierlein 2013, 
in this HSR Special Issue). 
In this article we will analyze the functioning of counter-conspiracy disposi-
tives and the nexus between conspiracy dispositives and security dispositives in 
the context of the political rise of Pim Fortuyn and the various conspiracy 
theories that arose after his murder and the effects these conspiracy theories 
had on Dutch politics and society. Further, we will analyze whether and how 
counter-conspiracy theories on the murder of Pim Fortuyn have influenced the 
construction of new modes of security governance. The analysis shows that 
although a small part of the conspiracy constructions can rightfully be under-
stood as counter-conspiracy dispositives, in the majority of cases a blurring can 
be noted between counter-conspiracy dispositives and conspiracy dispositives. 
This can be explained by the fact that – parts of – the seemingly counter-
conspiracy dispositives were initiated, adopted and instrumentalized by actors 
from ‘above’: actors from the Dutch political and cultural establishment. Politi-
cal parties and media with a right-wing political affiliation seized the oppor-
tunity with both hands to promote their own agendas. These parties and media 
outlets were in fact definite parts of the Dutch political establishment, but 
hitched a ride on the suggestion that political and cultural power had been 
fallen into the hands of leftish elites, resulting in excrescences like silencing 
political opponents, protecting violent leftish activists, eroding freedom of 
speech by delegitimizing criticasters of multiculturalism as ‘racists’ and gener-
ally neglecting the protests and desires of ‘the’ people. By siding with ‘the 
people’ in the gap between the leftish elite and the people successfully created 
by Pim Fortuyn, these establishment actors succeeded in presenting themselves 
as allies of the oppressed people and succeeded in instrumentalizing the senti-
ments set free by Fortuyn in a political agenda aimed at forcing left-wing poli-
tics onto the defensive. Behind the successful construction of a political divi-
HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  259 
sion between an unheard people and an arrogant, dangerous state elite, in fact 
an intra-elite competition was being battled out. The conceptual difference 
between conspiracy dispositives and counter-dispositives therefore runs the risk 
of labeling conspiracy dispositives as counter-conspiracy dispositives which in 
fact are the result of a deliberate construction by closet establishment actors. 
2.  The Political Rise of Pim Fortuyn 
On August 20, 2001, Pim Fortuyn announced his ambition to enter national 
politics and made it clear from the beginning what his ambition exactly was: he 
wanted to be the next prime minister of the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn, a flam-
boyant personality and former university teacher of Sociology and extraordi-
nary professor of Governmental Labor Relations, had already for several years 
been seeking the limelight by clear-cut and controversial opinions on Islam, 
integration, multiculturalism and the leftish political establishment that accord-
ing to Fortuyn had lost contact with the ordinary people and censured critical 
stances towards multicultural society by branding them as manifestations of 
racism. Fortuyn published his ideas and opinions amongst others in a weekly 
column in the largest Dutch weekly, Elsevier, and in a range of books.1 Fortuyn 
especially targeted the so-called ‘Purple Cabinets’, in which during the 1994-
2002 period the Dutch Labor Party PvdA, the conservative-liberal party VVD 
and the social-liberal party D66 had formed coalition governments. 
Fortuyn’s political ambitions were not taken very seriously by the other po-
litical parties, not even when he was chosen as party leader of Leefbaar Neder-
land (Livable Netherlands) on November 25, 2001. This new political party 
was formed in 1999 and originated from local ‘Livable’ parties, which agitated 
against too much national political influence on local affairs and argued for 
more direct democratic participation by introducing plebiscites and democrati-
cally elected mayors. Livable Netherlands was at first characterized as an “anti-
system party with a left-wing populist program” (Van Praag 2003, 101). Dur-
ing the course of 2001, however, and especially since the accession of Fortuyn, 
Livable Netherlands moved to the right side of the political spectrum and 
turned out to be especially attractive to people who traditionally voted VVD 
but felt this party had moved too much to the middle of the political spectrum, 
and to people who hadn’t voted for years (Van Praag 2003, 104). Livable 
Netherlands and Fortuyn forged a ‘monstrous alliance’: Fortuyn needed a polit-
ical vehicle to gain access to the political system and Livable Netherlands 
needed a charismatic front man (Van Rossum 2003). Soon Livable Netherlands 
                                                             
1  Amongst others De verweesde samenleving (1995); Tegen de Islamisering van onze cultuur 
(1997) and De Puinhopen van Paars (2002). 
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scored very well in election polls, which took the other political parties by 
surprise. Fortuyn’s fierce opinions against immigration policies (Galen and 
Van Holsteyn 2003, 49), combined with his provocative attacks against the 
‘Red Church’ and his mediagenic performances (Koopmans and Muis 2009, 
651), laid the foundation for his success. Especially cynical voters with a strong 
distrust against the government were appealed by the political performances of 
Fortuyn (Galen and Van Holsteyn 2003, 31). As a result of the convergence in 
mainstream party positions, Fortuyn became one of the few politicians with 
distinguishing features. Amongst part of the population, the notion prevailed 
that there was little left to choose during elections because mainstream parties 
were too closely connected with the powers that be and therefore turned a deaf 
ear to the worries of the common people; let alone that these parties would be 
capable of resolving these problems (Pennings and Keman 2002). Livable 
Netherlands thus displayed certain elements of an anti-state party (Dorussen 
2004, 137). 
The political rise of Fortuyn took place within a riotous and heavily polar-
ized climate. Fortuyn made bold statements about Islam, multicultural society, 
immigration and asylum policies and his political opponents. Statements like 
“I’m in favour of a Cold War against Islam. Islam forms a serious threat to our 
society” (Rotterdams Dagblad August 28, 2001), “You have to understand 
mosques as a front organization in which martyrs are being bred” (Elsevier 
September 1, 2001) and “I think Islam is a retarded culture” (De Volkskrant 
February 9, 2002) provoked screaming emotions and various lawsuits. His 
political opponents, however, kept their end up and disqualified Fortuyn as 
“dangerous”, “a polder Mussolini”, “right-wing extremist”, “ego-tripper”, “a 
political wild man”, “racist”, and “narcissist” (Meershoek and Schulte 2002). 
Fortuyn’s spectacular rise involved conspiratorial accusations from the begin-
ning. In February 2002, Fortuyn was brushed aside by Livable Netherlands 
after he argued in an interview with the daily De Volkskrant for the abolition of 
the constitutionalized prohibition of discrimination. Although Fortuyn had 
approved the final wording of the interview, he stated that he was the victim of 
a conspiracy. The chair of Livable Netherlands, Jan Nagel, also pointed in that 
direction when he stated that the reporters of De Volkskrant who did the inter-
view were members of a think tank of the social democratic Labor Party PvdA, 
together with other journalists. These journalists were accused of conspiring 
against Livable Netherlands and of using their newspapers to discredit Livable 
Netherlands. The interview that lead to Fortuyn’s split with Livable Nether-
lands was framed as a part of this conspiracy between the PvdA and ‘leftish’ 
reporters.2 After his forced departure from Livable Netherlands, Fortuyn 
                                                             
2  Subsequently a debate was started as to whether reporters should participate in these kinds 
of organizations. The accusations that the Dutch media were leaning to the left and were 
prejudiced would surface many times in the years to come on websites and in mainstream 
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founded a new political party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (The Pim Fortuyn List) and 
continued to be very popular in the election polls. However, the LPF also was 
surrounded from the beginning by scandals and turbulence. It turned out, for 
instance, that Fortuyn had hired a private investigative agency to screen the 
candidates for the LPF (Het Parool May 13, 2002). The word was that Fortuyn 
was shocked by the outcomes of the screening procedures, as at least four can-
didates of the LPF turned out to have serious integrity problems. Earlier one of 
the candidates, former police officer Martin Kievits, was already forced to step 
down after accusations of sexual intimidation. Kievits suggested that the top 
level of the Dutch police had deliberately orchestrated these accusations. “They 
had to destroy me because as a member of parliament I would have been too 
dangerous to them” (Cornelisse 2002).  
Notwithstanding these incidents, Pim Fortuyn and his party remained popu-
lar. According to the polls, a mammoth victory was on hand for the LPF as was 
a disastrous defeat for the PvdA and VVD. Meanwhile Fortuyn complained 
about the harsh critique his political opponents were articulating and stated that 
he was being ‘demonized’. Fortuyn received a range of death threats by letter 
or e-mail, was sometimes called names or molested during public appearances 
and during the presentation of his latest book, De puinhopen van Paars (‘Pur-
ple Ruins’), that also formed his election program, activists pushed a pie filled 
with filth in his face. Fortuyn overtly speculated about possible violent actions 
against him and connected this fear with the supposed demonization by his 
political opponents. “If anything were to happen to me, they are responsible,” 
he stated during a television appearance in March 2002. “Maybe they didn’t 
pull the trigger, but they fostered the climate. This has to stop. This demoniza-
tion has to stop.”3 
3.  The Murder of Pim Fortuyn 
On May 6, 2002, just before the national elections of May 15, Pim Fortuyn was 
shot dead at 18:00 when leaving the media complex in Hilversum. The murder-
er, Volkert van der Graaf, tried to escape but was arrested within ten minutes 
                                                                                                                                
media like De Telegraaf and Elsevier. Publications would also follow in which it was ‘re-
vealed’ that Dutch civil servants were leaning to the left and misused their power to sabo-
tage cabinets from the right. See for instance: Sjuul Paradijs (2002) ‘Fortuyn: Desnoods door 
met eigen lijst’, De Telegraaf, February 11, 2002; Trouw (2002), ‘Helpen journalisten de 
PvdA?’,  February 11, 2002; Willem Breedveld (2002) ‘Schijn des kwaads’, Trouw, February 
15, 2002; Jos Klaassen (2002) ‘Lezer heeft ook recht om nonsens te horen’, De Volkskrant, 
February 16, 2002; Bart Tromp (2002) ‘Journalistiek en complotten’, Het Parool, February 21, 
2002; Martijn Koolhoven (2003) ‘NOS Journaal ONDER VUUR’, De Telegraaf, November 1 , 
2003; Eric Vrijsen (2004) ‘Regeren: het ambtenarenverzet’, Elsevier, January 10, 2004. 
3  Pim Fortuyn in a television show hosted by Robert Jenssen; March 2002. 
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by local police. Van der Graaf turned out to be a political activist connected to 
environmental and animal rights organizations. After the news of Fortuyn’s 
murder was announced, riots broke loose in various cities in the country. An 
angry crowd besieged the parliamentary buildings in The Hague, resulting in 
fights with the riot police. A dozen politicians were moved by police to safe 
houses out of fear for their security. Especially leftish politicians were the 
target of anger and aggression. Disturbances, however, faded out during the 
next few days. The funeral of Pim Fortuyn on May 10, 2002, mobilized tens of 
thousands of people. Millions of others watched the ceremony on national 
television. National media framed the funeral of Fortuyn as an event of national 
mourning and deliberately tried to avoid any controversy or political connota-
tion (Pannti and Wieten 2005).  
On May 15, 2002 the LPF achieved a landslide victory in the elections and 
entered the Dutch Parliament with 26 seats. After a short formation period, led 
by Mat Herben who was chosen as the new party leader of the LPF, the LPF 
became part of a new cabinet together with VVD and CDA. However, the 
cabinet was forced to resign within a couple of months, partly due to quarrels, 
threats and splits within the LPF party group. After the 2003 elections the LPF 
still obtained eight seats in parliament, but would disappear from the political 
stage in 2006 and was formally disbanded as a political party in 2007. During 
its short-lived existence the LPF was surrounded by all kind of incidents in 
which conspiracy theories played an important role. Member of Parliament Jim 
Janssen van Raay, for instance, suggested a conspiracy when LPF parliamen-
tary candidate and former commander of the Royal Military Police André 
Peperkoorn backed away and stated that he was shocked by information about 
sexual intimidation within the LPF. According to Janssen van Raay, it was 
more plausible that Peperkoorn had information at his disposal about a conspir-
acy that was being plotted against the LPF. “Because of that he could easily get 
involved in a moral conflict because he is not allowed to share this information 
with his political colleagues. I think that’s a more plausible explanation,” 
Janssen van Raay stated (NRC Handelsblad May 23, 2002). Jim Janssen van 
Raay for that matter articulated his own conspiratorial explanation for the mur-
der of Fortuyn which, however, did not make a lasting impression. According 
to Janssen van Raay the Catholic Church was involved in the murder conspira-
cy. “Those people were certainly worried about the risk that a homosexual 
prime minister could discredit Rome (Trouw 2002a).” Accusations about con-
spiracies and coups d’état were also recurring themes in the internal fights and 
splitting that would finally lead to the implosion of the LPF and its disappear-
ance from parliament (Tuil 2002). 
The same night that Pim Fortuyn was murdered, speculations and accusa-
tions were launched concerning his death. The first building blocks of various 
conspiracy theories were brought up which would circulate for the next years to 
come. Accusations and conspiracy constructions first moved into all kinds of 
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directions but would later on crystallize into four more or less coherent con-
spiracy constructions. We can distinguish between (1) the demonization thesis, 
(2) the animal rights activist thesis, (3) the JSF thesis and (4) the diffuse thesis.  
4.  Demonization Thesis 
The night Fortuyn was murdered, his spokesman Mat Herben stated on national 
television that there was a clear connection between the murder and the ‘politi-
cal witch hunt’ launched by Fortuyn’s political opponents. “This murder is 
clearly the result of the hate campaigns launched by the left, with the PvdA in 
the lead,” Herben stated (Alberts and Kalse 2002). A week later the same accu-
sation was articulated by the chair of the LPF, Peter Langendam: PvdA and the 
Green Left party GroenLinks were responsible for the climate in which the 
murder of Fortuyn could take place (Van Lierop 2002). Five days after the 
murder, Fortuyn’s lawyers announced that they were investigating whether the 
politicians who had incited hate against Pim Fortuyn could be prosecuted 
(Weesie 2002). At the same time they announced investigations into probable 
faults that the government made in protecting Fortuyn. This last accusation 
would become the prime focus of the following political and societal debates. 
Especially the ‘pie incident’ of March 14, 2002, came to the forefront: during 
the presentation of his latest book, Fortuyn was harassed by activists who 
pushed a pie in his face and were able to escape from the police. According to 
the lawyers, shortly before being murdered Fortuyn had asked them to launch 
thorough investigations in case something were to happen to him, with a spe-
cial emphasis on the ‘demonization’ by prime minister Wim Kok (PvdA) and 
the political leader of the PvdA, Ad Melkert.4 
On the night of the murder, the cabinet decided immediately to establish a 
commission (the Van den Haak commission) that was tasked with investigating 
the governmental protection of Fortuyn. Resolutions by the LPF calling for the 
resignation of the ministers responsible for the protection did not get parlia-
mentary approval, pending the investigation (NRC Handelsblad June 19, 2002). 
During the months that the commission was investigating the case, conspiracy 
theories flourished. Supporters of the LPF organized a demonstration in front 
of the prison Van der Graaf was locked in as a protest against the time it took 
the commission to do their job. One of the twenty protesters was Martin 
Kievits, the former policeman and candidate for the LPF who was discredited 
with accusations of sexual intimidation. Kievits referred to the flourishing 
conspiracy theories and stated that the length of the investigation was partly the 
                                                             
4  On May 14th 2002 police arrested the activists, but there was no proof whatsoever that 
they were involved in the Fortuyn murder. See: NRC Handelsblad (2002), ‘Justitie houdt 
taartgooiers Fortuyn aan; Onderzoek naar beveiliging’, May 14, 2002. 
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reason for this conspiracy booming (Leeuwarder Courant September 23, 
2002). Conspiracy theories were nourished when media reported in October 
2002 that the Dutch security agency BVD had been eavesdropping on Fortuyn 
(Trouw 2002b). The accusations were dismissed as ‘nonsense’ by former min-
ister Klaas de Vries, in those days responsible for the BVD. At the same time 
the protection of politicians was the subject of dispute as LPF ministers com-
plained about a lack of protection. According to the political leader of the LPF, 
Mat Herben, “the state could not be trusted” (Dohmen 2002). 
Controversies rose again when the Van den Haak commission published its 
findings in December 2002 (Commissie Feitenonderzoek 2002). Although 
many mistakes were made in protecting Fortuyn, the commission concluded 
that no one could be blamed directly for this. The commission noted that the 
procedures for deciding whether a politician should be closely protected by 
governmental agencies did not function properly, nor did the cooperation and 
information exchange between the different agencies involved. Although in-
formation about threats being made against Fortuyn was collected by different 
agencies, the information was not exchanged or analyzed at a central level. The 
commission further stated a lack of professionalism in compiling risk analyses. 
On the basis of 25 incidents and threats made against Fortuyn since March 
2002, the commission concluded that Fortuyn should have been closely pro-
tected by the government; however, according to the commission, personal 
protection could not have prevented the May 6 murder from happening. More-
over, the commission concluded that Fortuyn distrusted the idea of personal 
protection even when it was offered to him. His party LPF also did not take any 
protective measures.  
Besides the ‘pie incident’ mentioned above, another incident popped up in 
the report of the commission that would become a permanent part of conspira-
cy theories on the Fortuyn murder. A police team (‘team Escape’) investigating 
radical animal rights activists had in the beginning of 2002 intercepted a tele-
phone conversation in which two activists told each other that ‘Fortuyn had to 
die’. Investigative officers who analyzed the intercepted call decided it was not 
a serious threat; an opinion that the Van den Haak commission endorsed. The 
Van den Haak investigation further revealed that Fortuyn had been blackmailed 
several times before his entrance into national politics.5 The commission stated 
                                                             
5  A week later it was revealed that the Van den Haak commission, out of fear of financial 
claims, had withheld certain information from the report indicating that Dutch intelligence 
knew about ‘risky sexual behavior’ of Fortuyn. The same information would hit the headlines 
again in 2005, as a prominent crime reporter revealed secret information left by an intelli-
gence officer in a lease car. Supporters of Fortuyn immediately suspected a conspiracy: it 
was no coincidence that this information was leaked just before the local elections of 2005. 
See: Marcel Haenen (2002) ‘Details afpersing Fortuyn verzwegen; Commissie vreesde 
schadeclaims’, NRC Handelsblad, December 28, 2002; AD/Algemeen Dagblad (2005) 
‘Ongeloof en woede na zoveelste fout AIVD - De Vries onthult zondag op tv de inhoud van 
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explicitly that no proof whatsoever was found of a deliberate governmental 
conspiracy to murder Fortuyn, nor any proof of deliberately indolent behavior 
related to the protection of Fortuyn (NRC Handelsblad December 17, 2002c; 
NRC Handelsblad December 17, 2002d; Het Parool December 17, 2002; 
Schulte 2002a; Schrooten 2002).  
The conclusions of the Van den Haak commission were rejected by the LPF, 
which dubbed the commission a ‘cover-up commission’ and demanded a new 
investigation. On the eve of the parliamentary debate in September 2003 on the 
Van den Haak report, the LPF presented a black book. One of the grievances of 
the LPF concerned three police and intelligence officers not interrogated by the 
Van den Haak commission due to sickness; an issue that had been raised earlier 
by the weekly Elsevier (Vrijsen 2003). Further, the Van den Haak commission 
was accused of explaining away the demonization of Fortuyn. The commission 
was ‘prejudiced’, history was being ‘twisted’ in the report and the commission 
was guilty of ‘subjective value judgments’. According to LPF member of par-
liament Joost Eerdmans, ‘highly placed political civil servants’ inside the de-
partment of Home Affairs refused to give Fortuyn personal protection as this 
would play into Fortuyn’s hands and reinforce his popularity. Although politi-
cal leader Mat Herben did not refer openly to a conspiracy, his statements came 
close to it. “What is it the government wants to cover up?”, he asked on the 
presentation of the black book. Herben believed it was ‘obvious’ that the cabi-
net feared Fortuyn was threatening their position of power and therefore delib-
erately decided to throw Fortuyn to the wolves in spite of his requests for per-
sonal protection. “Too many questions have not been answered. We want a 
new investigation in order to get all the answers. Otherwise the Netherlands 
will have its own Kennedy affair” (Rotterdams Dagblad August 1, 2003; 
Wagendorp 2003). 
In their black book the LPF repeated accusations against former Prime Min-
ister Kok and other politicians who had declared Fortuyn ‘a moral outlaw’ by 
their harsh critique (Schulte 2003). Minister of Justice Donner rejected these 
accusations fiercely and accused the LPF of unloading only insinuations and 
suggestions (Schulte 2002b). During the debate a majority of parliament dis-
missed most of the claims made by the LPF, but decided to launch a new inves-
tigation to find out whether Dutch intelligence had been eavesdropping on 
Fortuyn (Dagblad van het Noorden September 10, 2003). This investigation, 
however, did not reveal any new facts. Dutch weekly Elsevier, however, con-
cluded that the follow-up investigation revealed that the Dutch security agency 
BVD had been messing with internal records in order to disguise their blunders 
(Vrijsen 2004). Through the years several attempts would be made to prosecute 
                                                                                                                                
de gevonden diskettes’, December 9, 2005; AD/Algemeen Dagblad (2005) ‘Pim wordt 
postuum beledigd en kan zich niet verdedigen’, December 9, 2005; De Telegraaf (2005) 
‘AIVD: Fortuyn bij reeks seksorgieën’, December 12, 2005. 
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politicians for their responsibility or complicity in the murder of Fortuyn. None 
of these attempts, however, succeeded (Het Parool May 7, 2007; Van den 
Eerenbeemt 2007; AD/Algemeen Dagblad June 28, 2007).  
5.   Animal Rights Activist Thesis 
A second conspiracy theory focused on the network of environmental and 
animal rights activists that Volkert van der Graaf was part of. On the night of 
the murder, LPF member Gerlof Jukema stated immediately that a conspiracy 
existed to murder Fortuyn (Wagendorp 2002). Hans Smolders, Fortuyn’s driv-
er, who witnessed the murder and chased Van der Graaf as he was trying to 
escape, also stated that Van der Graaf must have had help from others. Accord-
ing to Smolders, a car and driver were waiting for Van der Graaf. Fred Teeven, 
Fortuyn’s successor as political leader of Livable Netherlands, also declared 
that more people were involved in the murder. Based on information made 
public by the Public Prosecutor and on his own experience as former prosecu-
tor, Teeven stated that it was “almost out of the question that the perpetrator 
had worked alone” (Leeuwarder Courant May 13, 2002).  
In January 2003, Dutch Daily De Telegraaf launched a theory in which the 
murder of Fortuyn was attributed to the activist networks in which Van der 
Graaf participated (Koolhoven 2003). A comprehensive article was dedicated 
to the network of activists and politicians in the city of Wageningen, where 
Van der Graaf had lived and worked for a long time. According to De 
Telegraaf, the radical network was subsidized by a range of governmental 
organizations and public lotteries that supported civil society organizations. It 
was in these networks that opposition against large-scale farming and biotech-
nology and gene technology was organized. Especially GroenLinks had to take 
the rap in the article. In the 1990s, a member of GroenLinks, Jack Borgers, had 
disclosed that the BVD had tried to infiltrate the network of environmental 
activists. “If Borgers hadn’t disclosed it, this could have been the opportunity 
for the BVD to obtain at an early stage information on the activities and radical 
body of thought of the future murderer of Pim Fortuyn,” De Telegraaf stated. 
The same Jack Borgers, by then layman and substitute mayor of Wageningen, 
leaked on the night of the murder the then still confidential information that 
Van der Graaf was the perpetrator to the organization (Milieu Offensief) that 
Van der Graaf was working for. “That way police never had the chance to be 
the first to speak with the controversial environmental activists and possibly 
that same night, incriminating material disappeared from the offices of Milieu 
Offensief”, De Telegraaf concluded. “Was this meant to protect environmental 
friends?”’ 
A few months later the story was elaborated by the weekly Elsevier. On 
June 28, 2003, Elsevier published an article which stated that those animal 
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rights activists were becoming more and more violent. Police, prosecution or 
intelligence services did nothing to counter the activists or were even stopped 
from doing so by politicians. “Volkert van der Graaf is not a loner”, Elsevier 
wrote. “He springs from a movement that year after year, day after day, does 
not take the slightest notice of the law.” According to Elsevier, farmers, mink 
breeders, butchers and even ordinary citizens visiting McDonald’s could be-
come the target of arson attacks or bomb attacks. “The fact that these attacks 
until now have only killed one man (Pim Fortuyn) is just coincidence,” the 
weekly concluded. Elsevier quoted Peter Siebelt, a self-declared international 
expert on terrorism and left-wing activism, who warned that actions by animal 
rights activists would only get worse due to the contacts between Dutch and 
British activists. “The British squatters and activists are notably harder and 
more professional than their counterparts on the continent because of their 
cooperation with the IRA,” Siebelt stated. The weekly further paid much atten-
tion to the connections between the ‘upper world’ and the ‘underworld’ of 
environmental activism. “The Netherlands is a real paradise for terrorists and 
therefore also for animal rights terrorists,” Elsevier concluded. The weekly 
suggested that the police investigative team Escape was deliberately dismantled 
because its investigations came to close to ‘upper world’ environmental organi-
zations like Milieudefensie. A spokesman of the farming sector stated in the 
article: “More people will be killed. Fortuyn will not be the last. Dutch politi-
cians then are also to blame. Police and intelligence are powerless thanks to 
politics. It is their responsibility that the judicial apparatus is incapable of pros-
ecuting and convicting these activists” (Roozendaal 2003a). 
In August 2003 Peter Siebelt published his own book, Eco Nostra, in which 
he connected the ‘upper world’ and ‘underworld’ of environmental and animal 
rights activists. The book was criticized for its suggestion that a world-
encompassing, centrally directed activist network existed in which almost 
every leftish, liberal and humanistic organization was involved. However, the 
same criticasters argued that there were enough facts in the book that justified a 
more serious approach to the activist world by media as well as police and 
prosecution (Gerritse 2003; Vermaas 2003; Van der Hoorn 2003; Meeus 
2003a). The book was used as evidence by representatives of the farming in-
dustry to call for a tough approach towards activists (Dagblad 
Tubantia/Twentsche Courant August 14, 2003). The book was also embraced 
by supporters of Fortuyn, although there was also criticism: Siebelt was work-
ing for the ‘old elites’ and was in fact a hired juggler of the Bilderberg organi-
zation. 
An important element in the reconstructions by De Telegraaf, Elsevier, Eco 
Nostra and other articles (Meeus 2003b) was the intercepted phone call be-
tween environmental activists in which they said ‘Fortuyn had to die’. The 
police team judged the threat not to be serious and didn’t forward the infor-
mation to the BVD. Only after the investigation into the security and protection 
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of Fortuyn by the Van den Haak commission was the existence of the inter-
cepted call revealed. The activists making the call were living in the same part 
of the Netherlands as Volkert van der Graaf and frequented the same activist 
circles. The intercepted calls, coupled with the fact that the team Escape was 
dismantled two months before the murder of Fortuyn, nourished the rumors 
that police and intelligence were aware of the plans to murder Fortuyn, but 
deliberately did nothing to prevent the murder (Koolhoven 2002).  
6.  The JSF Thesis 
A third conspiracy theory was also constructed almost on the same night of the 
murder. A well-known lawyer, Prem Radhakishun, outlined a Dutch conspiracy 
to murder Fortuyn during the popular talk show ‘Barend en Van Dorp’. Ra-
dhakishun mostly asked questions and pointed at facts that according to him 
were at odds with the idea that Van der Graaf acted alone. How was it possible 
that a lone killer could escape the Hilversum media complex through a back 
door almost nobody knew of? Why did it take the emergency services so much 
time before they arrived at the scene of the murder? How was it possible that 
the murder was executed in such a clearly professional manner? A week later, 
Theo van Gogh, a popular and controversial movie-maker and opinion-maker 
and close friend of Fortuyn, also spoke of a conspiracy to murder Fortuyn. 
Especially the fact that Van der Graaf had left one bullet in the pistol when he 
was arrested raised his suspicion. ‘That is a habit only professional killers are 
acquainted with [...] No matter how paranoid it may sound, I predict that this is 
not the work of a lone nutcase, but a conspiracy.’6  
The connection with the JSF project was made a few days later by opinion-
maker Pamela Hemelrijk, who judged the murder to be ‘too perfect’. At that 
time there was a fierce political discussion in the Netherlands about the pur-
chase of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as a replacement for the outdated F16 
fighter. A lot of money and political prestige was at stake, as were Dutch-
American relations. Pim Fortuyn was an outspoken opponent of the purchase. 
A few days before his murder he was visited by the American ambassador to 
discuss the issue. “What if this American gentleman thought Pim could be a 
danger for the political stability of this NATO country,” Hemelrijk asked. 
According to Hemelrijk, Van der Graaf perfectly fitted the profile of a “sleep-
er”, a hit man doing black jobs for intelligence agencies. “But closer to home, 
our BVD is also a much more scary organization than we realize,” Hemelrijk 
continued. “The powers that be were very nervous about Pim, and him taking 
office would be not good for their interests [...] I don’t think this was just a 
                                                             
6  <http://www.daanspeak.com/Fortuyn10.html> 
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leftish conspiracy, I rather think this was of much more significance. Pim simp-
ly wasn’t allowed.”7 
The JSF conspiracy was then further elaborated by thriller author Tomas 
Ross in his book De Zesde Mei (2003), and later turned into the movie 06/05 by 
Theo van Gogh. Fundamental in this conspiracy construction is that Van der 
Graaf was no more than a pawn in a game of chess related to the JSF purchase. 
The murder of Fortuyn, silently approved by the Dutch political establishment 
that saw Fortuyn as a danger to their privileged positions, had the function of 
launching his spokesman Mat Herben, former civil servant at the Ministry of 
Defence, member of the Freemasonry and visitor of the Bilderberg confer-
ences, into political power. The fact that the LPF, shortly after their entry into 
parliament, agreed to the JSF purchase counted as the ultimate proof of this 
conspiracy theory. Further, the JFS thesis was built around all kind of questions 
regarding ‘unexplained’ facts that apparently proved that Van der Graaf was 
indeed no more than a pawn. Various issues which from the beginning sur-
rounded the Fortuyn murder came to the surface again: the alleged presence of 
a second shooter8, the surprisingly fast presence of the police, the intercepted 
phone conversations between activists, and a cartridge that was found at some 
distance from the other cartridges. 
The book written by Ross sold more than 60,000 copies. The movie by Theo 
van Gogh, based on the book and shown after the murder of Theo van Gogh9, 
was visited by a large public. In 2010 the same conspiracy scenario hit the 
television, when the national station BNN broadcast a four-part documentary 
on the Fortuyn murder. Some 524,000 people watched the documentary. On the 
occasion of the premiere of the documentary, Ross stated that he believed the 
Fortuyn murder was a “simple yet brilliant conspiracy […] I know not every-
one believes in it. But hey, there are also still people who believe Lee Harvey 
Oswald killed Kennedy” (Ross 2010). The JSF thesis was applauded on the 
internet. “The possibility that the CIA with the help of the BVD recruited 
Volkert van der Graaf in order to safeguard millions or even billions seems a 
very plausible option.”10 
                                                             
7  <http://pimfortuyn.com/asp/default.asp?t=show&var=964> 
8  Which of course is a reference to the Kennedy murder. 
9  Theo van Gogh was murdered on November 2nd 2004 by Mohammed Bouyeri, a home-
grown Jihadist terrorist. As intelligence agencies again did not correctly analyze the threat 
emerging from Bouyeri, both murders are frequently named in the same breath and inter-
preted as comparable conspiracies: again a fierce criticaster of both Islam and the left es-
tablishment was murdered with the implicit or explicit approval of the leftish establishment. 
10  http://pimfortuyn.com/asp/default.asp?t=show&var=964 
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7.  Diffuse Thesis 
Shortly after the murder of Fortuyn, conspiracy theories appeared on the inter-
net in newsgroups such as nl.politiek and nl.actueel.pim-fortuyn. “Pim didn’t 
die because of an individual action. I’m convinced that something is rotten”, a 
writer stated on May 8, 2002, on nl.politiek.11 A first conspiracy theory was 
published on May 15, 2002, on the conspiracy website Daanspeak, resulting in 
a ten-part series of conspiracy stories related to Fortuyn.12 The rumors pub-
lished on the internet mainly mirrored questions and suggestions circulated 
before in mainstream media: the JSF project, the role of Mat Herben, the in-
volvement of internal or foreign intelligence agencies and the involvement or 
complicity of leftish politicians. The website Darkisland.nl grew into a starting 
point for all kinds of conspiracy theories on the Fortuyn murder. Three main 
arguments were articulated that claimed to explain the involvement of secret 
agencies and political actors in the Fortuyn murder: Fortuyn was becoming too 
important and powerful an actor and thus threatened the privileges of the pow-
ers that be; his Republican ideas were thought to be threatening for the monar-
chy and its advocates; his homosexuality was thought to be dangerous for the 
international reputation of the Netherlands. Judged by the amount of visitors, 
the website was a very popular one. Within a few days of its launch, the 
amount of visitors rose from four thousand per day to tens of thousands per 
day. According to the creator of the website, the different conspiracy theories 
were not only supported by followers or admirers of Fortuyn. “I think also a lot 
of his political opponents have their doubts about this slick liquidation,” he 
stated in an interview. “Too many coincidences are present in this case. Only 
when it has been proved beyond the shadow of a doubt who murdered Fortuyn 
will I terminate this website.”13 
Just like in mainstream media where much attention was paid to apparently 
inexplicable issues, the internet too was full of questions. These questions were 
partly targeted at inexplicable matters, like the question of “how on earth it was 
possible that a leftish lout was able to shoot that precisely”, the assumed pres-
ence of a second shooter and a mysterious gold-colored car, the clumsiness of 
Van der Graaf’s attempted escape and the quick arrest of Van der Graaf by 
police officers wearing bulletproof vests and accompanied by tracker dogs 
(Van der Beek 2002; Van Jole 2002). The common opinion was that Van der 
Graaf was just a pawn. However, opinions diverged on the question of who 
was behind the conspiracy and for what reason. The list of possible conspira-
                                                             
11  Most of the websites mentioned are no longer traceable on the internet. Some of them can 
partly be retrieved by using the tool ‘The Way Back Machine’. 
12  http://www.daanspeak.com/Fortuyn10.html 
13  Laurens Lammers, De moord en de complotten, http://www2.internl.net/nieuws/nieuwsbrief/ 
archief/2002/10/4.it 
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tors was long; the entire political and societal establishment could be the evil 
force behind the conspiracy. Among others, the PvdA was mentioned, as was 
the drugs mafia, the BVD, the leftish political scene, the monarchy, Al Qaeda 
and the CIA. Some of the conspiracy theories stretched the borders of the at 
that time more or less accepted assumptions. Some thought the Illuminati were 
behind the Fortuyn murder, a secret sect that had supposedly been responsible 
for wars and revolutions since 1776 in order to obtain world power. After the 
murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, new connections were construct-
ed. According to the writer of a letter to the editor of the Brabants Dagblad, it 
was no coincidence that exactly 911 days were between the murder of Fortuyn 
and the Van Gogh murder, just like between the Twin Towers attack (known as 
9/11 in the US) and the Madrid terror attacks of 2005. “The next phase of 
course will be a microchip in our body and the bankruptcy of America. Before 
we know it, we will be the slaves of the Bush family with its close connections 
to the Bin Laden family, and the Rockefeller family who earned a lot of insur-
ance money when the Twin Towers collapsed” (Brabants Dagblad December 
21, 2004).  
On websites characterized by their devotion to Pim Fortuyn and his political 
body of thought,14 the focus was initially on the alleged network of environ-
mental activists complicit in the murder of Fortuyn. Later the JSF thesis re-
ceived more attention, causing fierce discussions and divisions because old 
sores and quarrels inside the LPF rose again to the surface, especially concern-
ing the role of Mat Herben. Initially the ‘Fortuynistic’ websites did not start 
any real investigations into the murder as they merely – just like other websites 
– reacted to news reports, revelations or suggestions published by De Telegraaf 
and Elsevier. This changed, however, in November 2002, when the so-called 
Mishima-Cyber-Command (MCC) appeared on the internet.15 This group, 
according to themselves consisting of various investigative reporters and for-
mer members of intelligence agencies, constructed a conspiracy in which 
world-encompassing connections were ‘revealed’ between the Fortuyn murder 
and drug-smuggling operations from Suriname to the Netherlands, the Bilder-
berg organization, the JSF project, emission rights and the death of former 
Dutch politician Maarten van Traa.16 The MCC claimed to know the identity of 
                                                             
14  See for instance <http://www.pim-fortuyn.nl/pfforum/topic.asp?ARCHIVE=true&TOPIC_ID= 
6970>. 
15  <http://mcc-the-truth.wikidot.com/>; <http://the-biggest-secret.clubs.nl/nieuws/detail/137115_ 
mishima-cyber-command-mission-statement-in-the-fortuyn-murder>; 
<www.geocities.com/aaactions/index2.html>. 
16  Maarten van Traa was a Labour politician who led in the nineties a sensational enquiry into 
the use of prohibited investigative methods by Dutch law enforcement. October 21st 1997 
Van Traa was killed in a car incident. For a moment there was fear in political circles that 
the car accident was the result of sabotage but no proof was found. Conspiracy theories on 
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the second shooter (Abu Fatah, a Syrian hit man), who directly after the hit was 
transported to Schiphol airport in a dark blue BMW escorted by police. The 
group also claimed to have video footage in their possession on which the 
murder was captured. Within Fortuynistic circles a highly secret investigative 
team was formed that tried to get in touch with the MCC and for several 
months tried to find proof in support of this conspiracy theory. The investiga-
tive team, however, was plagued with internal fights, especially about the 
trustworthiness of the MCC, which seemed to have gone up in smoke since 
January 2003. Attention was then redirected to the question of who was behind 
the MCC: the BVD, the CIA, ‘Zionists’ or others. Furthermore, the investiga-
tors accused each other of treason, infiltration and double dealings. Old con-
flicts and personal vendettas were fought out in the open and members were 
banned from internet forums but popped up again under different nicknames. 
Some of the persons concerned turned to alternative left-wing magazines to get 
the MCC stories published,17 which sparked new mutual accusations of treason 
and defection.  
During 2004-2005 the MCC story ebbed away; however, occasionally the 
story popped up again. The MCC conspiracy theory for instance popped up 
again in 2007 on the occasion of the publication of a book on the Fortuyn mur-
der by actress and dancer Ine Veen. Former minister for the LPF, Hillebrand 
Nawijn, was present during the presentation of the book to the public. Accord-
ing to the 70-year-old writer, in her book all the names of the ‘real culprits’ had 
been eliminated under pressure from the publisher out of fear of lawsuits and 
financial claims. The book was ignored or ridiculed by the main media outlet 
(Van der Beek 2007). The exception to the rule was De Telegraaf in which 
columnist Bob Smalhout wrote a laudatory review. Smalhout was also the 
author of a laudatory preface in the book Eco Nostra written by Pieter Siebelt.18 
The book by Ine Veen was applauded on the internet, but also sparked renewed 
fierce discussions about the MCC conspiracy.19 Individuals who were in the 
days of 2002-2003 involved in the MCC investigation declared the MCC story 
to be a complete hoax and even declared the MCC topic taboo for Fortuynistic 
web communities. The only thing these investigators were still interested in 
was the question of who was behind the MCC, because they interpreted the 
                                                                                                                                
the car accident however still circulate on the Internet. See for instance: 
<http://www.klokkenluideronline.net/artikel/4307/de-maarten-van-traa-foundation>. 
17  <http://www.ravagedigitaal.org/AA-archief2003/2003archief/1603a10.htm>. 
18  Publisher Perry Pierik declared later in a book that he had a ‘fine intuition’ for books that 
would be well-received by readers of De Telegraaf, especially if columnist Bob Smalhout 
paid attention to the book in a review. Therefore Pierik published a laudatory book on the 
life and work of Smalhout. See: Lisa Kuitert (2009) ‘Rellen, roddels en complotten; Brieven 
van Aspekt-uitgever’, Vrij Nederland, February 14, 2009. 
19  <http://pim-fortuyn.nl/pfforum/topic.asp?ARCHIVE=true&TOPIC_ID=51564&whichpage=4>; 
<http://zapruder.nl/forums/viewthread/8830/P120/>. 
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MCC hoax as a deliberate scheme to send the Fortuynistic movement barking 
up the wrong tree. That way, attention was diverted from the real conspiracy 
and every suggestion about a connection with the JSF project could be ridi-
culed in advance.20 
The different conspiracy theories, however, kept on appearing on the inter-
net. No new information was added, but any event could give rise to renewed 
references to the theories. The debate started again, for instance, on the occa-
sion of the documentary broadcast by BNN in 2010 in which the JSF thesis was 
at the center. It was noted by one of the internet scribes that the documentary 
could not be found on the internet or looked back at using ‘Uitzending 
Gemist’.21 ”As if they want to disguise this uncomfortable news, so that people 
that have missed the broadcast are not able to look back.”22 The yearly com-
memoration of the Fortuyn murder on May 6 also set off conspiracy stories 
about the “most cowardly Bilderberg murder in history”.23 
8.  New Modes of Security Governance 
The Fortuyn murder, the failing protection and the different conspiracy con-
structions that circulated led to different countermeasures by the authorities. On 
the one hand the authorities tried to invalidate the various conspiracy theories 
by making them a serious part of the investigations into the murder. The Van 
den Haak commission stated for instance explicitly that they found no evidence 
whatsoever about a conspiracy or willful neglect by the authorities. The Public 
Prosecutor also devoted considerable time and energy to investigating whether 
Volkert van der Graaf had indeed acted alone. For months hundreds of activists 
from environmental or animal rights organizations were checked out, observed 
and bugged in order to find out whether Van der Graaf had accomplices. In 
addressing the court, prosecutor Plooij concluded: “All this shows that nobody 
used Van der Graaf as a cover and paid him for the murder.” However, the 
hope of the authorities that the investigation into the Fortuyn murder and the 
                                                             
20  <http://911-complotdenkers.blogspot.nl/2007/05/complot-pim.html>; 
<http://stgvisie.home.xs4all.nl/VISIE/jsf-moord-fortuyn.html>; <http://www.sdnl.nl/aivd-fortuyn. 
htm>; <http://pim-fortuyn.nl/pfforum/topic.asp?ARCHIVE=true&TOPIC_ID= 51564& which 
page=4>. A name mentioned frequently in connection with the MCC is JP Mante. According 
to the investigators Mante is a flunked former US intelligence officer. Mante still frequents 
all kinds of Fortuynistic websites and is believed to be using a dozen nicknames in order to 
create as much confusion and chaos as possible.  
21  ‘Uitzending gemist’ is a tool enabling the viewer to look back at previous television broad-
casts. 
22  <http://wacholland.org/nieuws/moordcomplot-pim-fortuyn>. 
23  <http://www.klokkenluideronline.nl/artikel/12977/pim-fortuyn-en-de-10-leugens#more-
12977>. 
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conviction of Van der Graaf would make conspiracy theories a thing of the past 
was not fulfilled (Middelburg 2003; Huisjes and Van ‘t Klooster 2003). On the 
contrary, the explicit statement by the Public Prosecutor that the aim of the 
intensive investigation was also to disprove conspiracy theories strengthened 
distrust. ”This wish to exclude conspiracy theories – by which they are trying 
to oppress the mistrust of the people – will not work, simply because there are 
more facts in favor of a conspiracy than against it.”24 
On the other hand, the Fortuyn murder and the conspiratorial accusations 
profoundly influenced the security discourse in The Netherlands. Immediately 
after the murder numerous politicians, mostly from the left, were threatened. 
The Royal and Diplomatic Protection Department (DKDB) was working over-
time in 2002 in order to protect a range of politicians and other public figures. 
Various politicians were accommodated in safe houses and protected on a 
permanent basis (De Volkskrant May 27, 2002). The political leader of the 
PvdA, Ad Melkert, received a cocked pistol (NRC May 25, 2002). Some politi-
cians decided to leave politics as a result of the persistent threats. During May 
2002, political parties and individual politicians were threatened more than a 
thousand times by letter, e-mail or telephone calls (ANP July 4, 2002). Given 
the huge impact the Fortuyn murder had on Dutch society and democratic order 
and the subsequent wave of death threats, the level of personal protection of 
politicians was dramatically strengthened in line with the recommendations of 
the Van den Haak commission. A new ‘System of Guarding and Protecting’ 
(Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen) was introduced in order to improve both risk 
analyses and the protection of objects, organizations and especially public 
figures. The ‘Guarding and Protection’ Unit of the National Coordinator for 
counterterrorism (NCTB 25 October, 2005) became responsible for the new 
system (NCTB 25 October, 2005; De Wijk 2012). In the next years, often under 
pressure from incidents, the new system was further strengthened and extend-
ed. Whereas the Netherlands had for years been symbolized by Dutch politi-
cians peddling on their bikes through the city of The Hague without any protec-
tion, nowadays politicians are transported in armored cars, accompanied by 
bodyguards, and public events they attend are heavily secured. 
A second security consequence consisted of a tougher approach towards po-
litical activists or loners threatening politicians. As a result of the above-
mentioned media reports on animal rights activism, a political call for a tougher 
approach was advocated. The Christian Democratic Party CDA stated that 
these News reports had ‘strengthened’ their opinion that there was a lack of 
action by the authorities against animal rights activists. ”By now it is clear that 
we are dealing with a group of people that should be monitored in a specific 
way,” CDA spokesman Wim van Fessem stated (Roozendaal 2003b). In the 
                                                             
24  <http://pimfortuyn.com/asp/default.asp?t=show&var=964>. 
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same article, LPF spokesman Joost Eerdmans stated: “These media reports 
confirmed my impression that if the team Escape had not been dismantled, Pim 
Fortuyn would still be alive.” In a review, the weekly Elsevier that started the 
news reports called it “striking” that leftish politicians were not advocating a 
tougher approach. “This gives the impression that leftish politicians are not 
willing to condemn violence by leftish activists,” the weekly concluded 
(Roozendaal 2003b). CDA spokesman Van Fessem added: “In the past every-
thing left or progressive has been declared sacred. In line with this leftish 
crimes were extenuated.” Joost Eerdmans (LPF): “In the last years there has 
not been any attention given to the dangers of leftish violence. Even Dutch 
intelligence is still inclined to look more to the right than to the left.” The call 
for a tougher approach was converted into a high-priority approach towards 
activism by law enforcement, prosecution and intelligence, though no spectacu-
lar investigative results would be achieved. The political pressure to label and 
prosecute animal rights activists as ‘terrorists’, however, failed (AIVD 2004, 
20; AIVD 2009, 8). 
The political climate regarding political activism was moreover hardened in 
a more general way, especially when it came to threats against politicians. In 
June 2004 for instance, a lot of fuss was made when two activists who had 
besmeared minister of Asylum Policies Verdonk with tomato ketchup were 
released after a short detention, although they had refused to reveal their identi-
ties. The day after the incident, a man threatened minister Verdonk during a 
radio interview, claiming that he was speaking on behalf of the two activists. 
”Incomprehensible,” LPF leader Mat Herben described the fast release of the 
activists. ”There were enough facts and reasons to keep them in detention. 
There should have been an extensive investigation into their connections with 
activist circles and their history. Nothing has been learned from the Fortuyn 
murder.” The spokesman of the social liberal party D66, Boris Dittrich, argued 
that “the prosecutor should give this death threat the highest priority” and that 
Dutch intelligence agencies should be involved in the investigation. “Freedom 
of expression is at stake,” Dittrich stated. “We have to learn from the Fortuyn 
murder.”  
The man who had threatened Verdonk was later prosecuted for ‘crimes 
against national security’, as were the activists responsible for the besmearing 
of minister Verdonk. The same section of law was launched more often by the 
Public Prosecution against menacing individuals. This approach was supported 
by former minister of the Interior Hans Dijkstal, but criticized by lawyers. They 
feared a too harsh approach. Actions that used to be qualified as frivolous were 
by now interpreted as the first potential step towards a political murder. The 
Public Prosecution, however, denied the existence of an orchestrated action to 
dust off old and hardly used sections of the existing law in order to enable a 
tough prosecution against activists. However, the Amsterdam-based Public 
Prosecutor Dop Kruimel pointed at the Fortuyn murder to justify the tough 
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approach. ”We have our feet firmly on the ground. The Fortuyn murder has 
changed the context in which we assess such threats.” The spokesman of the 
College of Procurator-General also declared that the murder attack by Volkert 
van der Graaf had consequences for the criminal justice system. “The Fortuyn 
murder was a turning point. The prosecution is responsive to the spirit of times. 
The Fortuyn murder was an attack against the democratic order. We have to 
take that in account” (Algemeen Dagblad June 19, 2004; Schreuders 2004; 
Vogels 2004; Kruijt 2004). 
Meanwhile a special police squad, TBP (Threatened Politicians Team), was 
instituted for the investigation and prosecution of individuals threatening na-
tional politicians. During 2004-2011, every year more than two hundred reports 
of threats against politicians were investigated. By that time politicians of every 
political affiliation were more or less used to a steady wave of insults and 
threats. The threateners could be divided into different categories. The category 
of so-called ‘street language threateners’ existed of mostly Dutch-Moroccan 
youngsters who insulted and threatened politicians who spoke negatively about 
Islam or Muslims via websites, e-mails or rap songs on YouTube. Especially 
Geert Wilders of the PVV (Freedom Party), which can be considered to be one 
of the heirs of Pim Fortuyn’s political legacy, was the target of this category. 
Further, there was the category of ‘confused threateners’ formed by middle-
aged native Dutchmen with mental health problems. They bore malice against 
social welfare workers or doctors who had treated them wrongly and worked 
off their anger by threatening ministers or members of parliament. Moreover 
there was the category of ‘frustrated’ and ‘frustrated and confused’ threateners: 
middle-aged native Dutchmen extremely aroused by increasing rents, kilometer 
taxes or the Islamization of society (Broer and Van Wezel 2010; NCTB 2010). 
Next to the TBP, a registration center for internet discrimination tried to chal-
lenge racism and hate speech on the internet. 
The prosecution of menacing individuals sparked fierce reactions from in-
ternet communities. Especially on websites devoted to the Pim Fortuyn legacy 
or websites in support of Geert Wilders, the actions by the authorities were 
depicted as attacks on freedom of speech and renewed attempts to silence criti-
cal voices on multicultural society and leftish politics, just as the authorities 
tried to silence Pim Fortuyn by murdering him. 
As soon as you publish some critical thoughts on the web, the Thought Police 
will show up at 5.00 AM, but of course only when you are a native Dutchman 
with a right affiliation who stands up for his opinion and therefore is consid-
ered to be a danger for the multicultural Islamic utopia. The past is brought to 
life in Holland Pravda country.25  
                                                             
25  <http://www.forum-voor-de-vrijheid.nl/showthread.php?t=2161>. 
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The prosecution of Geert Wilders on the suspicion of hate speech was framed 
in the same way. In addition, a fusion took place with a new conspiracy theory 
which the supporters of Geert Wilders were embracing: Eurabia. This conspir-
acy construction states that Europe is the deliberate target of Islamization as the 
result of secret agreements between European and Arabic elites. As a conse-
quence, freedom of speech is to be restricted in order to prevent any form of 
criticism against Islam or multiculturalism.  
Thus the same two-faced enemy constructed around the Fortuyn murder – 
Islam and leftish elites – popped up again. The trial against Wilders was inter-
preted as the ultimate proof of the leftish intention to silence opposition against 
immigration and multiculturalism – exactly as the Eurabia thesis predicted. As 
‘Rudolf’ wrote on the internet: “The prosecution of Wilders fits the Eurabia 
script, because he constitutes a major obstacle for the emergence of Eurabia.”26 
Wilders also referred to Eurabia in his concluding speech in court: “Only fools 
believe this is an accident. Throughout Europe the multiculturalists are waging 
a total war against their own populations. Their aim is to continue mass immi-
gration, resulting in an Islamic Europe – a Europe without freedom: Eurabia” 
(Nederlands Dagblad February 8, 2011; Kuypers 2011; De Jong 2011). For 
that matter, the same writers and media promoting the Pim Fortuyn conspiracy 
theories turned up in support of the Eurabia conspiracy: columnist Smalhout of 
De Telegraaf, the weekly Elsevier, and columnist Pamela Hemelrijk. 
9.  Conclusion 
This article looked into the conspiracy constructions following the Fortuyn 
murder, starting from the assumption that conspiracy dispositives and security 
dispositives nourish and influence each other. The Fortuyn conspiracies have 
been conceptualized as constructions from the bottom up, which we have la-
beled counter-conspiracy dispositives. Their function is to delegitimize the 
state and the powers that be and to legitimize actions – whether or not with a 
violent character – against the prevailing order. The Pim Fortuyn murder and 
the various conspiracy theories have left their marks on Dutch society and 
political culture, in different ways. The rise of Pim Fortuyn was from the very 
beginning accompanied by conspiratorial elements. This can be explained by 
the populist nature of Fortuyn. Populism and conspiracism are closely connect-
ed and can be considered to be a match made in heaven as they are both cen-
tered on the opposition between a homogeneous, evil elite and a homogeneous 
pure people as the representation of good virtues, true wisdom and authenticity. 
                                                             
26  <http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=2236394337487817559&postID= 
919817164196491900>. 
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The inclination to conspiracy theories might be regarded as a logical conse-
quence of the aforementioned perception of the elite as both a homogeneous 
and a corrupt group (Vossen 2010). Although within populism the ‘elites’ can 
be represented in different disguises, in the case of the Fortuyn murder the 
elites were successfully equated with ‘the left’. Furthermore, both populism 
and conspiracism are characterized by scapegoating. In this case, next to the 
leftish elite, Islam, Muslim immigrants and multicultural society were scape-
goated. The riotous and polarized climate in which the political entrance of 
Fortuyn occurred, coupled with Fortuyn’s warnings against ‘demonization’ by 
the ‘Red Church’ and preluding a possible attack on his life with the moral 
responsibility attributed beforehand to the left for such an event, formed the 
perfect breeding ground for the emergence of conspiracy theories after his 
death. Further, two other elements frequently mentioned in social science lit-
erature as of importance for the emergence of conspiracy theories were present: 
the huge impact of the murder going beyond the imaginable (Räikkä 2009, 
197) and a series of ‘unanswered questions’ in the reconstruction of the murder 
(Keely 1999, 117-8).  
However, the analysis also shows that the conceptual difference between 
conspiracy dispositives (invoked by the state) and counter-conspiracy disposi-
tives (raised from the bottom up by oppositional actors) is in need of further 
elaboration. Whether a conspiracy dispositive is invoked top down by the state 
or bottom up by oppositional actors is not so much a question that can be de-
cided on objective grounds or something that can be assumed to exist beyond 
doubt, but can in itself be the result of strategic discursive interventions by 
establishment actors estimating that a ‘counter-establishment’ position will 
further their interests. In fact, the main parts of the different conspiracy theories 
on the Fortuyn murder were first articulated by mainstream media, politicians 
and opinion-makers with a right political affiliation or attracted to the body of 
thought of Fortuyn or by columnists and opinion-makers with easy access to 
mainstream media and politics. One could state that political parties and media 
with a right political affiliation seized the opportunity with both hands to pro-
mote their own agendas. These parties and media – with the possible exception 
of the LPF – were in fact definite parts of the Dutch political establishment, but 
hitched a ride on the suggestion that political and cultural power had fallen into 
the hands of leftish elites, resulting in excrescences like silencing political 
opponents, protecting violent leftish activists, eroding freedom of speech by 
delegitimizing criticasters of multiculturalism as ‘racists’ and generally ne-
glecting the protests and desires of ‘the’ people. By siding with ‘the people’ in 
the gap between the leftish elite and the people successfully created by Pim 
Fortuyn, these establishment actors succeeded in presenting themselves as 
allies of the oppressed people and succeeded in instrumentalizing the senti-
ments set free by Fortuyn in a political agenda aimed at forcing left politics 
onto the defensive. Behind the successful construction of a political division 
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between an unheard people and an arrogant, dangerous state elite, in fact an 
intra-elite competition was being battled out. 
This blurring between counter-conspiracy dispositives and conspiracy dis-
positives is carried on in both the reception of the different conspiracy theories 
and the different new modes of security governance that were established after 
the Fortuyn murder. Both the ‘demonization thesis’ and the ‘activist network 
thesis’ had the strongest impact. The ‘demonization thesis’ has mainly planted 
itself into political discourse. Especially Geert Wilders and his supporters on 
the internet regularly refer to ‘demonization’ whenever political opponents 
express fierce criticisms. The implicit suggestion is that fierce critique is the 
forerunner of a political assassination. This constitutes an effective strategy 
both to underline the underdog position of the PVV vis-à-vis the political estab-
lishment and to force opponents to moderate their critique. Evoking the re-
proach of ‘demonization’ in fact calls to mind the murder of Pim Fortuyn. 
Sometimes this strategy is used very explicitly. Geert Wilders for instance 
stated during a 2010 election debate with PvdA leader Job Cohen that for six 
years now, he had “had to debate while wearing a bulletproof vest”. On the 
same occasion Wilders referred to the Fortuyn murder when he stated that 
“people who criticize Islam are being murdered or receive thousands of death 
threats.”27 
The Pim Fortuyn conspiracies thus refer to the future as well as to the past: 
the alleged conspiracy that resulted in the murder of Fortuyn applies likewise to 
future criticasters of Islam and left politicians: assassination. Internet audiences 
in which a virulent anti-Islam and anti-leftish discourse is articulated interpret 
the Fortuyn murder as a mark of the malicious power of the left and as proof of 
the bankruptcy of Dutch democracy. Moreover, the Pim Fortuyn conspiracy 
has by now been blurred with other conspiracy theories, especially the Eurabia 
thesis and conspiracy theories targeting the European Union, presented as a 
left-inspired dictatorial project aimed at destroying national sovereignty and 
individual freedom. One can speak of a homeopathic effect of the Pim Fortuyn 
conspiracies: without the need to really account for various facts, outstanding 
questions, futile efforts to prove the conspiracy and speculations that never 
survived confrontation with the facts, even a strongly watered-down reference 
to the Fortuyn murder suffices to bring conspiracy connotations to life that 
point at the malicious role of the left in silencing opponents, if necessary with 
force. 
The ‘activist network thesis’ converted itself mainly into efforts to legiti-
mize though security approaches against environmental and animal rights ac-
tivists. Mainstream media like Elsevier and De Telegraaf took the lead, sup-
ported on the political level by LPF, CDA and VVD. These activists had 
                                                             
27  <http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Politiek/267615/Wilders-Ik-debatteer-al-zes-jaar-met-
kogelvrijvest-aan.htm>. 
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already for some time been a thorn in their flesh and the connection with 
Volkert van der Graaf presented a window of opportunity to criminalize activ-
ists, force moderate environmental organizations onto the defensive and intro-
duce tough security policies. Without saying out loud that environmental and 
animal rights networks conspired to murder Fortuyn, the suggestion was con-
sequently spread that Fortuyn would never have been murdered if only law 
enforcement and intelligence had taken a tougher stance. By suggesting more-
over that leftish activists were being protected by leftish political parties, left 
politics was more generally forced onto the defensive. 
The JSF thesis, on the other hand, while being by far the best worked-out 
conspiracy construction of the Fortuyn murder, never became a serious topic of 
investigation by mainstream media or the authorities or used as a political tool. 
Although environmental activists do not come off unscathed in this script, the 
main culprits are situated inside Dutch and American intelligence agencies, the 
leftish media, monarchy and the interested business partners involved in the 
JSF purchase. Further, due to the fact that Mat Herben, the successor of For-
tuyn as political leader of the LPF, was depicted as a Bilderberg mole, the JSF 
conspiracy theory was controversial inside the Fortuynistic movements. A 
further complication was the fact that the left political parties were fierce oppo-
nents of the JSF purchase. Thus the JSF conspiracy theory didn’t fit easily into 
the favored ‘leftish evil elite contra the good people’ scheme. The JSF thesis 
resonates more strongly within conspiracy audiences not affiliated with the 
Fortuyn movements, probably because of the connections with Bilderberg, the 
USA and the monarchy.  
The same can be said of the reception of the diffuse conspiracy theories. Be-
sides some persistent internet investigators, hardly anyone supported or acted 
upon these conspiracy constructions. They were ignored in mainstream media 
or just presented as examples of nutcases who were chasing shadows – which, 
however, was interpreted by some Fortuynistic websites as proof of another 
conspiracy: by deliberately carrying conspiracy theories on the Fortuyn murder 
into the extreme, every conspiracy theory would effectively be delegitimized. 
This case shows that conspiracy constructions are hardly effective outside 
directly involved conspiracy audiences as long as they are not being picked up 
one way or the other by mainstream media, opinion-makers or politicians be-
cause it fits their agenda. These diffuse conspiracy theories seem to fit most 
closely the conceptualization of counter-conspiracy dispositives. 
When looking at the new modes of security governance established in the 
post-Fortuyn era, comparable differences can be noted due to the blurring of 
counter-conspiracy dispositives and conspiracy dispositives. Enhanced security 
measures targeting political activists and menacing individuals were at first 
dominated by the post-Fortuyn agenda: an offensive against left activist and 
left politics. The alleged conspiracy of activist networks was deployed in a 
classical vein by establishment actors to mobilize popular support for a tough 
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security approach. Activists acknowledge that the involvement of Volkert van 
der Graaf in the Fortuyn murder and the subsequent offensive against activists 
and moderate organizations alike has damaged their movements and forced 
them onto the defensive.28 Again, the mere suggestion of a possible conspiracy 
seems sufficient to have the desired effect. However, efforts to prosecute ani-
mal rights activists as ‘terrorists’ failed and in spite of enhanced efforts by 
police and intelligence to dismantle the activist networks, the theme of the 
animal rights activists’ threat has disappeared from the center of public and 
political debate. It would be an over-exaggeration to characterize this as a new 
and lasting mode of security governance. 
Further, a complicating factor was that in due course new modes of security 
governance in the context of activists, death threats against politicians and hate 
speech not only hit left-wing activists but also right-wing populist internet 
audiences who were not averse to threatening leftish politicians or discriminat-
ing against Muslims. Right-wing populists tried to frame these actions by the 
police as proof that democratic order in the Netherlands had been abolished and 
that the institutions of the state were held firmly by the left and were being 
used to silence political opponents – just as happened with Fortuyn. However, 
mainstream media and politicians from the right side of the political spectrum 
did not want their fingers burnt by digital big-mouths prosecuted for hate 
speech, racism or death threats. These examples suggest that the linkage be-
tween conspiracy dispositives and security dispositives is more complicated 
and messy and should not be understand as an almost linear or mechanistic 
process. Conspiracy dispositives can be used to establish new modes of gov-
ernance, but these attempts can fail, only partly succeed or transcend the origi-
nal political intention. However, within these right-wing populist internet audi-
ences, dynamics can be discerned to the full extent in which government is 
consequently depicted as an undemocratic and hostile entity oppressing the 
people and is therefore a legitimate target for resistance, and every security 
measure is interpreted as a deliberate strategy to consolidate the power of the 
left and to silence the people. Again it is in these circles that the working of 
counter-conspiracy dispositives and its relationship with ‘counter’ security 
dispositives can be detected at its optimum. 
Comparable comments can be made regarding the personal protection of 
politicians which was drastically enhanced in reaction to the Fortuyn murder. 
The accusation that the authorities had been deliberately neglectful in protect-
ing Fortuyn was surely one of the causes of this. However, even if these accu-
sations had never been articulated, the enhanced protection regime would have 
been enforced. The shock of the assassination and the subsequent societal and 
political polarization were simply too large to ignore. The Fortuyn murder and 
                                                             
28  See for instance <http://www.animalfreedom.org/paginas/opinie/effectief.html>. 
HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  282 
the following murder of Theo van Gogh, the threat emerging from Jihadist 
terrorism and a general feeling of insecurity propelled security to the highest 
priority of government, supported by all political parties. The enhanced protec-
tion regime has by now become standardized and normalized and is hardly the 
subject of fierce debate. This shows that conspiracy dispositives are not im-
perative for the emergence of new modes of security governance. 
Conspiracy theories surrounding the murder of Pim Fortuyn have left their 
marks in Dutch political culture. Interacting with the emerging right-wing 
populism, which has a conspiratorial nucleus, conspiracism has established 
itself more than before in the discourse and perception of parts of Dutch popu-
lation which have a fundamental distrust and aversion towards politics, con-
vinced that the Netherlands labors under a politically correct left-wing dictator-
ship. The Pim Fortuyn murder played an important role in this and has by now 
been mixed with other conspiracy constructions on Eurabia, the European 
Union, the New World Order, Bilderberg and the Illuminati. The lasting sug-
gestion is that the powers that be – to be precise: the leftish powers that be – 
show no mercy when it comes to defending their privileges and power posi-
tions. Although since 2002 no new facts or interpretations have surfaced, the 
various conspiracy theories can pop up again on any occasion. The October 
2012 rumor that Volkert van der Graaf was granted probationary release, for 
instance, started the conspiracy carousel all over again.29 In reproducing ‘old’ 
conspiracy theories the internet of course plays an important role, as old stories 
can easily be republished and linked to other sites, by which a large audience 
can get acquainted with the main conspiratorial themes. Thus one can speak of 
lasting effects of the conspiracy theories on Dutch politics and society. Howev-
er, the fact that main proponents of the ‘counter-conspiracy dispositives’ were 
in fact closet establishment actors calls into question the conceptual strength 
and clarity of differentiating between counter-conspiracy dispositives and con-
spiracy dispositives. New modes of security governance resulting from the 
Fortuyn conspiracies reflect this hybridization of counter-conspiracy disposi-
tives and conspiracy dispositives and have been proven to be only loosely 
related to the dynamics of conspiracism. 
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